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EQUAL RIGHTS IN DIVORCE AND SEPARATION
JENNIE D. BEHLESt
AND DANIEL J. BEHLEStt

The most potentially all-encompassing changes looming on the
legal horizon today are the changes which will be required by the
highly publicized Equal Rights Amendments. The purpose of this
paper is to consider the present state of New Mexico law
concerning divorce and separation with a view to pointing out
those areas most likely to be affected by the passage of an Equal
Rights amendment, to show how present law violates the spirit or
the letter of the proposed amendments, and to suggest changes
that might be required to comply with the proposed
amendments. To begin our discussion we must consider the
moving force behind the incipient changes, the proposed Equal
Rights Amendments.
There are two proposed Equal Rights amendments that
potentially affect New Mexico-state and federal. The proposed
Amendment to the New Mexico Constitution is contained in
House Joint Resolution Number 21 which was passed by the 1972
legislature. The amendment will be submitted to the electorate at
the next general election, and if approved, would amend Section
18 of Article II of the New Mexico Constitution to read as
follows:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law; nor shall any person be denied equal protection of
the laws. Equality of rights under law shall not be denied on
account of the sex of any person. The effective date of this
amendment shall be July 1, 1973.

The proposed amendment to the United States Constitution is
contained in House Joint Resolution Number 208, passed by
Congress on March 22, 1972.2 The proposed amendment reads as
follows:
Section I. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.

1. N.M.H.J. Res. 2 (1972).
2. H.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date
of ratification.

We have neither the time nor space here to explore the
differences between the two amendments or the policies behind
them. Two things only should be kept in mind as we consider the
laws relating to divorce and separation in light of these proposals.
First, if these amendments are passed, the New Mexico amendment will have the most immediate effect because of its earlier
effective date. If the amendment is approved by the voters in the
1972 General Election the 1973 Legislature will have little time to
legislate any corrections to our existing law. It will take an
emergency clause to make any corrective legislation take effect
before the amendment. The problem is not theoretical, but
immensely practical. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly,
we must remember that this amendment is designed to provide
equality between the sexes. The mass of publicity about the
"Women's Lib" movement and its support for these amendments
sometimes creates the impression that these proposals are solely
attempts to improve the lot of women. Actually, as we shall see,
there are many areas in existing law where men are being
discriminated against, and the proposed amendments will work
in their favor. Particularly is this true in the area of divorce and
separation.
With these two caveats in mind, we can proceed to an
examination of existing law.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Subject matter jurisdiction in all divorce actions lies in the
District Courts. 3 Similarly, subject matter jurisdiction is what is
maintenance" cases is also vested
here loosely termed "separate
4
Courts.
in the District
Specifically in divorce actions, either the plaintiff or the
defendant must have resided in New Mexico for at least six
months immediately preceding the filing of the complaint and
have domicile within the state. Domicile for the purpose of
divorce is defined by statute as being a).physically present in this
state and having a place of residence here, and b) having the
3. N.M. Stat. Ann. §22-7-1 (1953).
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-2 (1953).
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present intention in good faith to reside in New Mexico
permanently or indefinitely. Special provision has been made to
define domicile in the case of military personnel. 5
Under New Mexico law the husband is the head of the family
and may choose any reasonable place or mode of living and the
wife must conform thereto. 6 This statute seems to indicate that
the husband has the exclusive right to determine the wife's
domicile, so that a wife could not establish a home here apart
from her husband even if she had the present intention to remain
within the state permanently or indefinitely.
Frequently it has been said that the wife, since she cannot
establish a domicile separate from her husband, cannot file for
divorce within the state where she resides because her legal
domicile is in the state where her husband has chosen to reside. 7
At first blush this would seem to be the rule under the above New
Mexico statute. However, the great weight of authority today is
that, although the wife's domicile is usually that of her husband's,
if necessary she may acquire a separate domicile for the limited
purpose of filing for divorce. 8 Professor Leo Kanowitz has
determined that in all states today married women are permitted
to acquire a separate domicile for the purpose of instituting
divorce proceedings. 9
Our own court considered this problem in Bassett v. Bassett 10
and said:
Where a ground for divorce, that is, incompatability, exists she (the
wife) is justified, under the law, in establishing a separate residence
and domicile from that of her husband.

The right of the wife to establish a separate residence and
domicile from that of her husband for the purpose of obtaining a
divorce would also appear self-evident from the wording of the
New Mexico divorce jurisdiction statute."
Our rule is as it should be with respect to divorce because
without this special domicile exception in the case of divorce it
5. N.M. Stat Ann. § 22-7-4 (Supp. 1971).
6. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-2-2(1953).
7. Heimler v. Heimler, 129 N.J.Eq. 479, 19 A.2d 790 (1941); Coheen v. Coheen, 233 Ala. 494,
172 So. 618 (1937).
8. Annot., 39 A.L.R. 710 (1925).
9. Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law, 12 St. Louis U. L.J. 3, 18 (1967).
10. 56 N.M. 739, 250 P.2d 487 (1952).
I1. N.M. Stat. Ann. §22-7-1 (1953).

January 1973]

DIVORCE AND SEPARATION

seems certain that any Equal Rights amendment would require
men.' 2
the rules governing domicile to be the same as those for
It is possible that the husband's right to choose the family's
residence could bar the wife of a non-resident from filing for the
New Mexico equivalent of separate maintenance. This type of
suit may be instituted in the county where either of the parties
resides. 13 Under the law which allows the husband to choose a
reasonable place to live and requires the wife to conform thereto,
those women who cannot come within the Bassett rule would be
without the remedy afforded by separate maintenance.
Admittedly, since we have incompatability as a ground for
divorce it would be the rare wife who could not find a ground for
divorce to bring her within the Bassett rule, but it is not an
impossible situation. Experience has shown several cases where
husband and wife have lived together amicably enough, but
simply preferred to live alone or with someone else. In such a
case the wife of a non-resident would be unable to file a separate
maintenance action in New Mexico. The simplest solution in this
case would be to repeal the cause of the problem, Section
57-2-2.14 Repeal would not be disruptive and would clearly allow
all women the right to maintain an action for separate maintenance on equal footing with men. Once a spouse has decided that
he or she desires to separate from the other the rule as it exists
does not promote harmony, but rather increases strain, and
15
places an unequal burden on the wife.
GROUNDS AND DEFENSES

There are ten different grounds for divorce in New Mexico
listed in two separate statutes. They are 1) abandonment, 2)
adultery, 3) impotency, 4) pregnancy at the time of marriage by a
man other than the husband, if the husband is ignorant thereof,
5) cruel and inhuman treatment, 6) neglect on the part of the
husband to support the wife, according to his means, station in
life and ability, 7) habitual drunkenness, 8) incompatability, 9)
conviction of a felony, and imprisonment therefore, subsequent
to the marriage, 16 and 10) incurable insanity existing continuousA Constitutional Basis
12. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment:
(1971).
941
871.
L.J.
Yale
80
for Equal Righisfor Women,

13. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-3 (1953).
14. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-2-2(1953).

15. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 12, at 942.
16. N.M. Stat. Ann. §22-7-1 (1953).
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ly for a period of five years preceding the filing of the
complaint. 17 Only grounds 3, 4 and 6 appear to be discriminatory. Generally divorce grounds may be used by the defendant as
defenses, though defenses are rarely presented, and in such a case
grounds 3, 4 and 6 would be equally discriminatory.
Ground three, impotence, is generally used to refer to a male's
inability to copulate and is also used synonomously with
sterility.' 8 Hence a woman may obtain a divorce because her
husband is unable to have sexual relations with her or is sterile,
but her husband has no recourse for his wife's frigidity or
sterility. This is discriminatory on its face.
Ground four, pregnancy of the wife at marriage by another
without the husband's knowledge, appears to give tacit recognition to the double standard of sexuality so frequently discussed in
popular literature today. A good reason exists for this ground,
based upon the legal presumption or fiction that a child born
during a valid marriage is presumed to be the child of the
husband and he is then responsible for its support. 19 It is only fair
to say that a man should not be forced unwittingly to support a
child which is not his or live with that child's mother after she has
practiced a deception upon him. Likewise, a wife may suffer if
her husband acknowledges and accepts responsibility for the
support of a child which he fathered out of wedlock, or if he is
adjudged a father in a bastardy proceeding and ordered to
support a child of which his wife had no knowledge. If the wife
had no knowledge of the existence of such a child prior to their
marriage, she may also desire a divorce and resent the use of
community funds, or even her husband's separate property, for
the support of the child. 2 0 If we forget, as we should, the scarlet
aura that we attach to the wife's premarital pregnancy, arising
solely from many years' acceptance in our society of the "double
standard," ground four is also discriminatory on its face for not
allowing wives divorces when the husband is a secret father.
Ground six, failure of the husband to support the wife, is, of
course, an outgrowth of the statutory duty of the husband to
support the wife. 2 ' The Court said in Taylor v. Taylor22 that the
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

N.M. Stat. Ann. §22-2-7 (1953).
Black's Law Dictionary 889 (4th ed. 1951).
14 C.J.S. Chid,§ 1108 (1939).
Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 12, at 951.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-2-3 (1953).
20N.M. 13, 145 P. 1075(1915).
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husband's non-support was a sufficient ground for divorce in
every instance, except if it was unintentional. Unintentional
non-support, as used in Taylor, seems to cover only cases of
illness, physical or mental disability.
The husband's duty to support the wife has for many years
been the norm in our society. But this norm is rapidly changing.
Today modern marriage is considered to be a partnership with
each spouse contributing in some form to the support of the
other. In the past all married men worked and few married
women did. Today more and more women are employed outside
of the home and contribute financially to the support of the
family. Much publicity has been given to role reversal in
marriage, and some couples are actually putting the wife to work
outside the home and the husband to work inside it.
Under present law the wife has a duty to support her husband
only if, due to infirmity, he is unable to support himself and has
no separate or community property upon which to draw for
support. 23 The wife's non-support is not a ground for divorce in
any case. This is blatantly discriminatory because it places an
unequal burden upon the husband. This is neither in accord with
modern marriage theories, nor attuned to a society where a large
percentage of married women are gainfully employed.
It is only fair to say that in New Mexico much of this might be
irrelevant except in the academic sense since incompatability is
allowed as a ground for divorce and is the one most commonly
used. Incompatability can probably be found in any of the
discriminatory situations which have been mentioned here.
of discriminatory grounds may
However, the very presence
24
tensions.
social
increase
The most satisfactory solution to the problems mentioned in
this section would be to abolish all grounds other than incompatability for the reason that this would, best comply with the
recognized practice in this state of filing almost exclusively on
this ground. Also, there is a growing trend toward removing all
fault basis from divorce grounds for social and psychological
reasons, and repeal of all other grounds would be in line with this
25
trend.
If all grounds except incompatability are not repealed it will be
23. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-2-5(1953).
24. Kanowitz, supra note 9,at 65.
25. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 12, at 949.
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necessary, in order to comply with an Equal Rights Amendment,
to add frigidity of the wife, a wife's non-support of the husband,
and a husband's fathering a child out of wedlock without the
wife's knowledge as additional grounds for divorce.
ALIMONY AND DIVISION OF PROPERTY

When we approach the subject of alimony and property
settlements we invariably become tangled up in the principles of
community property which underlie so much of the marriage
relationship. Because a divorce is in essence a dissolution of the
community it is impossible to completely separate our discussion
from a discussion of community property principles, but we will
try to limit ourselves to those areas of the law governing divorce
and property division which are discriminatory by themselves,
and not because of the specific instances of sexual discrimination
which pervade our community property law.
When we first look at the statutes governing the property rights
of husband and wife we are tempted to believe that there is no
sexual discrimination written into our law. Section 57-2-1 proclaims the obligation of husband and wife to each other.
"Husband and wife contract toward each other obligations of
mutual respect, fidelity and support. '2 6 (Emphasis ours). But that
initial aura of equality quickly disappears in the face of the laws
which follow. Under N.M.S.A. section 57-2-3 if the husband
neglects to make adequate provision for the support of the wife,
except in the cases mentioned in the next section, any other
person may, in good faith, supply her with articles necessary for
her support, and recover the reasonable value thereof from the
husband. 27 Section 57-2-4 N.M.S.A. provides that a husband
abandoned by his wife is not liable for her support until she
offers to return, unless she was justified, by his misconduct, in
abandoning him; nor is he liable for her support when she is
living separate from him, by agreement, unless such support is
stipulated in the agreement. 28 According to section 57-2-5 the
wife must support the husband out of her separate property when
he has not deserted her, and he has no separate property, and
there is no community property, and he is unable, from infirmity,
to support himself.29
26.
27.
28.
29.

N.M.
N.M.
N.M.
N.M.

Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.

Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.

§ 57-2-1 (1953).
§ 57-2-3 (1953).
§ 57-2-4(1953).
§ 57-2-5 (1953).
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The result of these sections is to place on the husband the
burden of supporting his wife, with the threat that he will be
charged for her upkeep if he does not do so, while the wife is only
obligated to support her husband when he is infirm and
impoverished. It would seem that the easy solution for a wife
burdened with an ailing husband would be to divorce him, since
the obligation would then cease. Under state law a court is
authorized to award alimony only to the wife. 30 No provision is
made for alimony to the husband, even in extreme cases. Since
section 57-2-5 requires a wife to support her husband only if he is
infirm, presumably by terminating his status as husband through
divorce a wife can avoid any further liability for support.
We see then that the law requires a husband to support his wife
and gives the court power to take his property for the support of
his ex-wife, while a wife has only a duty to support a husband
who is ill, and cannot be required to support an ex-husband,
whatever his condition. Clearly an Equal Rights Amendment
would require that our laws be changed to reflect the mutuality of
obligation given lip service in section 57-2-1 by making each
spouse equally responsible for the support of the other, and by
making each one liable for alimony in appropriate cases.
A more blatant discrimination is evident when we investigate
the New Mexico statutes governing division of property and
establishment of post-divorce obligations. While the wife may be
entitled to slightly favored treatment during the existence of the
marriage, it is in the dissolution of the contract that her welfare is
most especially protected, to the detriment of the male partner.
The principal section of New Mexico divorce law governing
31
the disposition of the property of the parties is N.M.S.A. 22-7-6.
Although too voluminous to quote in its entirety, this section
gives the courts discretion to do the following:
a) provide for the support of the wife during the pendency of
the suit;
b) insure the wife an efficient presentation and preparation of
her case; and
c) allow the wife alimony, in lump sum or installments, from
the separate property of the husband.
30. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-13 (1953). "In divorce, separation or support suits between husband
and wife, the court may make an allowance to the wife of the husband's separate property as
alimony, and the decree making such allowance shall have the effect and force of vesting title to
property so allowed in the wife."
31. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-2-6(1953).
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The husband is not allowed support, attorneys fees or alimony,
except in the rare case covered by N.M.S.A. 22-7-11,32 which
allows alimony and fees to an insane spouse in the court's
discretion. An Equal Rights Amendment would require the
removal of this built-in bias.
Statutory law is not the only law which expressly favors the
wife in divorce situations. Case law closely follows the lead of the
legislature in exhibiting its concern for the "weaker" sex, and the
courts do not hesitate in exercising their discretion in making
orders and decrees which benefit the wife to the detriment of the
husband. Section 22-7-6 referred to above allows the court wide
discretion, and the courts have exercised this discretion to benefit
the wife even though she may have been the "guilty" party, if
that term can justifiably be applied to a divorce situation.
In Redman v. Redman, 33 the court in discussing section 22-7-6
said:
This section constitutes a clear and unequivocal grant of power to
district courts to award the wife, in divorce actions, reasonable
alimony, in installments or lump sums, independent of which
spouse may have been the guilty party. The power is limited only
to a grant of a reasonable sum, as that factor is limited by the facts
of the particular case.

In another case, the defendant husband was protesting the
award of alimony as being in violation of a pre-separation
agreement between the parties which recited that no alimony
would be asked for.34 The court did not decide that issue directly,
but gave some indication of its feelings when it said, "Whether
such an agreement would be invalid as an attempt to oust the
divorce court of its jurisdiction, and against public policy, would
be worthy of consideration if the point were adequately presented."
This power of the court to award the wife alimony is not
entirely based upon a desire to see that her needs are being met;
in at least one case the court seemed to indicate that the right to
support from the ex-husband is somehow inherent and not based
on need. In Lord v. Lord35 the defendant had been ordered to
pay $100 monthly to his ex-wife. When the husband re-married,
32.
33.
34.
35.

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-11 (1953).
64 N.M. 339, 328 P.2d 595 (1958).
Oberg v. Oberg, 35 N.M. 601, 4 P.2d 918 (1931).
37 N.M. 24, 16 P.2d 933 (1932).
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he stopped the alimony payments. In ordering the husband to
continue, the court said that the mere fact that the former wife
was being comfortably supported by her father was not a
sufficiently changed condition to warrant abrogation of the
alimony provisions of the divorce decree. The court said that only
a showing of inability, to support the present wife, or undue
hardship, would justify a termination of the alimony.
36
In a later opinion rendered in the same case, the court was
ruling upon the wife's request for attorneys fees for the previous
appeal. In granting her request the court made a statement of
policy which is worth repeating for the insight it gives into the
built-in judicial bias in favor of the wife.
We have held that on an appeal in a divorce case we have the
inherent power to allow the wife suit money to enable her to
present her case (citing earlier case).
This allowance to the wife is founded upon the husband's legal
obligation to furnish necessaries, upon his control of the community purse, and upon the statutory policy that, in the trial court at
least, the wife shall have the means for "efficient preparation and
presentation of her case."
• . . The policy which insists that the wife have counsel when
her marital status and support are involved originally would seem
to require the same protection when the latter is again jeopardized.

Here the court seems to feel that "once a wife, always a wife"
and the husband's duty to furnish necessaries continues long
after the relationship which originally gave rise to that obligation
has been terminated.
So far we have been discussing alimony and attorneys' fees,
but these are not the only financial matters which have to be
determined between husband and wife. Where children are
involved there is also the matter of child support, but since the
award of child support follows and is dependent upon the award
of child custody, that topic is treated in the section dealing with
child custody.
Finally, there is the matter of the division of the community
property. In most states this subject never arises in divorce, since
in a non-community property state the earnings and property
acquired by the husband belong solely to him. In New Mexico
the community property laws dictate that one-half of all the
property acquired during the marriage, with few exceptions,
36. Lord v. Lord, 37 N.M. 454, 24 P.2d 292 (1933).
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belongs to the wife. Thus it becomes necessary in divorce to
separate out the wife's one-half share and set it aside to her.
It is only fair to point out that there is nothing inherently
discriminating about splitting community property. In theory, the
whole idea of community property is to give the wife some
recognition and reward for her contributions to the family life.
But the theory is often forgotten when it comes down to the
actual practice of "splitting the sheet."
In the average New Mexico divorce it would not be too much
of an exaggeration to say that the wife gets most of the property
and the husband gets most of the debts. There are several ways to
explain this result, some of which may seem quite fair. First, it
can be stated that the wife usually has custody of the children
and needs more of the property to care for them. Or it can be
pointed out that the wife probably has no job or skill, and will
have difficulty finding employment in order to take care of
herself. Since the husband is probably earning more money, he
can better afford to pay the debts. No doubt the desire of the
family's creditors to have a responsible party as debtor rather
than an unemployed female is indirectly responsible for the
common practice of making most of the debt the sole responsibility of the husband. Whatever the reason, the husband rarely gets
his fair one-half share of the community property.
This becomes doubly unfair when we realize that in addition to
giving up most of what the couple has acquired during the
marriage, the husband could be required to pay alimony to the
wife. In theory her one-half of the property should obviate the
need for further support, but in fact not only does she usually
receive the lion's share of the property, but all too often alimony
in addition.
In many instances the preferential treatment the wife receives
is disguised as child support. The amount that the husband is
required to pay as child support often exceeds the one-half
maintenance that is his legal obligation, and often is sufficient to
take care of all their needs with an additional portion left to go
toward the support of the wife.
In Harper v. Harper 7 the court explained why the wife got
what amounted to the bulk of the property:
The primary question submitted for decision
is whether the
37. 54 N.M. 194, 217 P.2d 857 (1950).
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district court upon decreeing an absolute divorce of the wife from
the husband and ordering a dissolution of the community with a
division of the community estate, may properly set over to the wife
his one-half interest in a real estate purchase contract and a deed of
trust, identified and adjudged to be community property, in lieu of
an award of lump sum alimony ...
It is true enough that the statute authorizing an award of
property in lieu of alimony mentions only "separate property" ... this circumstance is entitled to little weight when we
consider that upon division of community property incident to
divorce, separation or support suit, what was theretofore community property becomes henceforth the separate property of the
38
respective spouses. [The wife got all the property.]

In many cases the husband and wife agree to a division of the
property and sign a property settlement agreement which is
incorporated in the divorce decree, subject to the court's approval. This method saves the embarrassment and expense of having
the court investigate the extent of the community assets and
divide them. But a husband who is contemplating such an
agreement had better be sure that his wife gets at least her
to help
one-half share or more, because the courts stand ready
39 the court
Cornell,
v.
Cornell
In
rights.
the wife enforce her
overturned a property settlement agreement incorporated in a
divorce decree upon the wife's showing that her share was less
than a full one-half share of the total value of the community
estate. In rejecting the agreement, which the wife had signed, the
court said:
It is the duty of the husband to show the payment of an adequate

consideration, full disclosure as to the rights of the wife, the value

and extent of the community property, and that the wife had
competent and independent advice in the execution of the
40
separation agreements. [The wife was granted an additional $750
attorney fee plus an enlarged share of the property.]

that the
By these words the court not only seems to be saying
fair and hire
husband must be fair, but that he must prove he was
women
a lawyer for his wife to check his fairness. In an age when
no
played
and
matters
were not allowed to dabble in financial
a
been
have
part in managing the family property, this might
38. Id. at 195; 196; 217 P.2d at 858.
39. 57 N.M. 170, 256 P.2d 543 (1953).
40. Id. at 173; 256 P.2d 536, 537(1953).

NEW MEXICO LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 3

defensible position. But today, when statistics show that in a
majority of American households the wife is the money-manager
and purchasing agent, such discrimination is intolerable. No New
Mexico case could be found wherein the husband overturned a
settlement because his wife failed to make full disclosure, but in
today's society such a situation is not so implausible as it might
seem. Certainly our law should give equal rights to both parties
in claiming an equitable portion of the community estate.
So far we have been dealing with sexual discrimination as it
arises in divorce cases. But there are other ways in which th&
marriage relation can be terminated, and there, too, the built-in
bias in favor of the female is apparent.
N.M.S.A. 57-1-941 contains restrictions on the power to annul
marriages and rules as to what types of marriages may be
annulled. Buried in the middle of the section is this curious
provision concerning the annullment of marriages between
minors under the age of consent: ". . . and in the case of a
female, the court may in its discretion grant alimony until she
becomes of age or remarries."
We have already seen that N.M.S.A. 22-7-242 provides for
alimony to the wife in a separate maintenance suit. In addition
one must remember that the husband's duty to support the wife
continues all through the time of any separation, unless the
parties have agreed to the separation and the agreement makes
no provision for support. Furthermore, N.M.S.A. 57-3-743
provides that the earnings of the wife and any children living
with her or in her custody while she is living separate from the
husband are her separate property. Thus her earnings are held
free from community debts, while the husband's earnings
continue to bear the label of community property and remain
subject to the community indebtedness. To remedy this inequality, and Equal Rights Amendment would probably require that
the statute be changed to provide that the earnings of each
spouse, while they are separated, remain their separate property.
Of course, if the parties agree to separate, they can make
provision for the support of either of them by agreement. This is
the only way, other than by becoming insane, in which a husband
could be entitled to receive support from his wife.
41. N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 57-1-9(1953).
42. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-2 (1953).
43. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-3-7(1953).
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CHILD CUSTODY

Child custody as a consequence of divorce is the area of
divorce law least likely to be affected by the passage of an Equal
Rights amendment. This is due primarily to the courts, which
defend any sexual discrimination by concealing it behind the
smokescreen of "child welfare."
The last statement deserves some explanation, because if the
statutory law is not discriminatory one would wonder why the
courts would have need of a defense for sexual discrimination. In
the writers' opinion child custody is the area in which sexual
discrimination although disguised, is most prominent in practice.
While we have no statistics to support our statements, we think
we run little risk of exaggeration when we say that in the majority
of divorce cases where the custody of a minor child is at issue, the
wife ultimately ends up with legal custody of the child. In a
certain percentage of cases this result may be due to agreements
between the husband and wife wherein he willingly agrees to her
custody, but we suspect that a large number of these agreements
are the result of a lawyer's advice to their husband clients that the
trouble and expense of a custody battle are not justified, since the
wife usually wins. Regardless of the reason for the result, the fact
is indisputable that in a large majority of divorces the minor
children end up in the custody of the wife.
Yet the law regarding the rights of parents to the custody of
their children contains no built-in discrimination such as we saw
in the case of the laws governing alimony and property division.
N.M.S.A. 22-7-644 authorizes the court to make orders concerning the guardianship, care, custody, maintenance and education
of the minor children of the parties to a divorce. The statute
contains no specific declarations as to who has a right to the
custody, and the courts customarily have had extremely wide
latitude in exercising their discretion..The laws which the court
follows in determining the custody of children in general are
beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that in general
the natural parents have rights superior to those of anyone else,
and as between the two parents nothing matters except the
paramount concern, the welfare of the child.
44. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-6(1953).
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Since as between mother and father the law has no openly
avowed presumption as to who has a better right to the custody
of a minor child, the facts of each particular case control. When
we examine the actual results, however, we discover that most of
the time the mother gets the children. The quick answer, and the
normal one used to justify this result, is that in the majority of
cases the court determines that the welfare of the child is best
served by placing it with its mother. This principle has almost
attained the status of a legal presumption, although the courts
have been careful not to label it as such. Only one New Mexico
case has been discovered which specifically deals with this
principle. The Court in Ettinger v. Ettinger4 5 said:
Our statute relating to custody of children is § 32-1-4, N.M.S.A.
1953, which provides as follows: the parents of a minor child shall
have equal powers, rights and duties concerning the minor. The
mother shall be as fully entitled as the father to the custody, control
and earnings of their minor child or children. In the case the father
and mother live apart the court may, for good reasons, award the
custody and education of their minor child or children to either
parent or to some other person ...
We concede that, as a general rule, the courts are reluctant to
deprive the mother of the custody of a very young child. . . .Although no New Mexico case in point has been called to our
attention, inAlbright v. Albright, 1941, 45 NM 203, 115 P.2d 59, the
court, in its opinion, did quote from the opinion of the trial court in
that case, a part of which stated: The welfare of the child is a
matter of course of primary interest. A child of tender years, such
as this one, its normal place is with its mother. 46

The court then went on to quote with approval an opinion
from the Supreme Court of Oregon, which said in part, "In all
cases motherhood is a factor to be given great weight in deciding

questions of child custody. ' '47
We think it is accurate to say today that New Mexico courts
start off with the proposition that a young child should be placed
with its mother. This is discriminatory in a most insidious way,
because the courts justify this position by stating that it is the
welfare of the child which is determinative, and not the sex of the
parent which gets custody. Yet when we investigate the reasons
for the presumption in favor of motherhood we see that in
today's society it loses some of its validity.
45. 72 N.M. 300, 383 P.2d 261 (1963).
46. Id. at 303, 383 P.2d at 263.
47. Shrout v. Shrout, 224 Ore. 521, 356 P.2d 935 (1960).
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In an earlier age when a woman's place truly was in the home,
raising the children, a small child was placed with the mother
because the father worked for a living all day and could not
properly supervise his child. Also, a woman was judged better
able to perform the life functions of cooking for, clothing,
cleaning, and feeding the child. In that earlier day this was
probably true, But the facts today are different. Rare is the
divorced woman whose alimony and property settlement is so
generous that she can afford not to work. In this day of
compulsory education when the child, after age six, is supervised
daily by professional teachers for most of the day, the necessity of
having a parent at home is decreased. The average father no
longer works 60 hours a week, but 35 or 40. Child day care
centers, babysitters, and the new labor-saving technology in the
modern home makes it practical for a father to care properly for
a child while maintaining a full-time job. In short, there is often
very little difference between a father and a working mother in
the amount of time and attention they can devote to raising a
child properly. The very social forces which have given rise to the
agitation for an Equal Rights Amendment have dissolved many
of the differences between the father and the mother which once
made the preference for the mother justifiable.
Unfortunately, however, an Equal Rights Amendment will
have little effect on the prevailing customs regarding child
custody for the simple reason that the courts openly acknowledge
that they are protecting the welfare of the child, and not really
discriminating against the father. Until the society changes its
ideas and mores to conform in practice to what the Equal Rights
Amendment provides in theory, judges will continue to award
custody to the mothers, and the fathers will continue to be
discriminated against, not because of any real consideration of
the child's welfare but rather because of society's preconceived
notions of how family roles affect the child's welfare.
Child support tbllows child custody and N.M.S.A. 22-7-1548
gives the court authority to make an allowance from the property
of either party to support the children. This seems equitable on
its face, but no case has been found wherein the wife was
required to pay child support to the husband for children placed
in his custody. For practical purposes the responsibility of paying
48.

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-15 (1953).
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child support is normally solely on the husband, whether he is
given custody or not.
CONCLUSION

We have seen briefly those areas of the law concerning divorce
and separation which are potentially in conflict with an equal
rights amendment. We have hopefully suggested the form which
corrective legislation should take in order to bring our statutory
law into compliance with the amended Constitution. There are
other ways in which corrective measures could be taken and we
have suggested only some of many ways in which the reform
could be accomplished. The only point we urge is that, in some
way, the reform be accomplished in the legislature through
corrective legislation rather than in the courts.
Assuming that the 1972 election brings ratification of the New
Mexico Amendment, the time is short in which the new laws
must be created. But a legislative study committee, supported by
the resources of the organized bar and the law school, could
accomplish the task in the time available. If the legislature is
prepared to take action to prevent the disruption which will occur
if the changes are not made, we can have an updated, compatible
set of statutes by the time the amendment becomes effective.
Much has been said against the passage of the amendment,
based on the chaos that would result because of the conflict with
our existing laws. This chaos will exist in no small measure if the
legislature fails to act, and makes a political issue of what should
be a technical, corrective issue.
As a lawyer one is always hesitant to voice any criticism of the
bench, but in this instance we feel even the judiciary would agree
that it would be an unfortunate mistake to leave the task of
changing our laws to the courts. In the courts the task of bringing
existing law into compliance could only be done on a piecemeal
basis, as the issues arose in lawsuits. The changes would be made
in an unorganized way, with no effective method of replacing
those laws which the court strikes down. The new laws would
eventually have to pass the legislature anyway. Most attorneys
would agree that the courtroom is a last resort as a means of
settling disputes, and it is equally inefficient as a means of
changing legislation.
Our statutes need changing. The legislature has an opportunity
to perform a vital and crucial function in 1973. If it accepts the
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challenge and moves quickly to prepare a comprehensive plan of
corrective legislation, New Mexico will be the better for it. We
feel that the law school and the bar association would be eager to
provide whatever assistance is asked of them. The choice now lies
with our elected representatives-to accept the concept of the
Equal Rights Amendment and take active steps to align our laws
with its principles, or to lie dormant and abrogate its responsibility to an already over-burdened judiciary.

